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petinggroups, teams, clubs, cooperatives(coalitionsforshort) eachofthem
persecutingthesamegoal(inturnprovisionofcommodities, maximization
ofpro…ts, raisingofpublicfunds, standards ofbehaviouretc.). Examples
ofthisbehaviourarenumerousbothatmicroandmacrolevel: scienti…cre-




goal. O ncecoalitions form, societyis partitioned inacoalitionalstructure.
T hisfacthasalreadybeenobservedandstudiedinanumberofworksfrom
di¤erentpointsofview: amongthem [7 ], [1], [11]dealtwiththeproblemof
coalitionformationfortheprovisionofpublicgoods, [8]withtheproblem
oftheformationofcooperativesofworkerswithdi¤erentworkingcapacity,













howasocietywillform acoalitionalstructure. W eapproachtheproblem
in twosteps;…rstweexamineagents’behaviourwithin eachofthepossi-
ble coalitions can form andwe investigate thekind ofequilibriathatwe




rulegoverningtheallocation oftheobtainedoutput. O nceweknowhow
peoplebehaveinacoalition, weproceedbackwardandstudywhatkindof
coalitionalstructures canform in suchawaythatnoonehas an incentive
todeviatefrom. Inthis stageweshallseethattheequilibrium coalitional
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structures depend on the institutionalsettings rulingthe degree ofsocial
mobilitywithinpopulation. W eexaminetwoextremeinstitutionalarrange-
ments: inthe…rstweassumetheretobeperfectmobilityandcapacityto
changecoalitions, while, intheother, weassumeanextremelylimitedmo-
bilityduetothefactthatevenasinglevetocanforbidtheformationofa
coalitionalstructure. A sweshallsee, thesetwoextremecaseswillgiverise
totwodi¤erentsetsofequilibriumcoalitionalstructures.
Inoursettingagentscanengageinpre-playnon-bindingcommunication
amongthemselves (see [8]). Bythis theycanagreeonpareto-dominating,
self-enforcingequilibriainanyoccasionaselectionproblemisconcernedwith.
H owever, justbecausesuchpre-playtalksareunbinding, noonecanbeforced
toperformactionsnotcompatiblewithindividualincentivesand, forexam-

























in allcharacteristics and endowedwith one unitoftimeand one unitof
aphysicalcapital. Capitalis usedwith labourtoproduceaconsumption
commodityY bymeansofapubliclyandfreelyavailabletechnology. T here
arenoalternativeusesforcapital.
A gents can produce the commodity Y eitherin isolation orwithin a
group. Ittakesplaceinagroupwhenagents inasubsetSµ=pooltheir





Y , letX SdenotethecardinalityofS. A coalitionSisproper if2 ·X S·I ;
ifX S = 1, S is asingleton. A coalitionalstructure is apartitionof=into
subsetsandisdenotedby¾ = fS1;S2 ;:::;Sj;:::;SJg, whereJ2 N + isthe
numberofnon-emptygroups inthecoalitionalstructure¾. A nycoalitional
structuremustsatisfythefollowingproperties:S J
j= 1Sj= =8(h ;j), h 6= j, Sh \Sj= ;, Sh ;Sj2 ¾.
L et§ bethesetofallpossiblecoalitionalstructures in=.
2.1 Individualcharacteristics
L etlidenotetheamountoftimethatagentispendsonproduction, li2 [0 ;1].
IfanagentchoosestoparticipateintoacoalitionShemust…rstcontribute
his own capitalendowment;then hehas todecidetheamountoftime li
todedicatetoproduction;hence (1¡li) is theleisuretime. T hemorehe
spendshistimeonproduction, themorethetotaloutputincreases;butone
unitofleisuregiveshim anutilityof!1. A nagentcanalwaysdecidenotto
participateinacoalition;insuchacasehekeepshis capitalendowmentto
produceinautharchy.
















production function F (K;L), where K is the capitalstockand L is the
amountoflabour;clearly, in anycoalition, 0 · L · K sincenoonewill
contributehis ownworkinge¤ortin acoalition in which hehas noright
toreceivetheproducedoutput. W eassumeF (:;:) tosatisfythefollowing
properties.
A xiom1 TheproductionfunctionF (K;L) is suchthat
1. F (K;L) = A¢minfK ® ;L®g
2. 2 ¢! > A > !
3. ® > 0
N otice thatA xiom 1 togetherwith 0 · L · K yield toF (K;L) =
A¢L® . T heparticularformoftheproductionfunctionisasimplifyingdevice,
allowingforreturnstoscaletolabourinvarianttotheamountoftheworking
e¤ortputintotheproductionprocess;themagnitudeofthereturnstoscale
dependsonthevalueof® . T hefactthatthescaleparameterA is greater
than theoutsideopportunity serves onlytoinducetheperformingofthe
workinge¤ortwhenanagentactsalone, whilethefactthat2 ¢! > A serves
toexcludethatcooperationmayariseinpropercoalitionsforreasonsthatare
notjuststrategic. Itisworthnoticingthattheproductionwithinacoalition




ofsomeofits members, itis thenredistributedwithinthesamecoalition.









nalityX SandsaythatY S isthetotaloutputproducedwithinSbymeans
oftheworkinge¤ortsofitsmembers, i.e. Y S = A¢³P j2Slj´ ®;thenforall
i2Swehave






where R i(:) denotes thequantitythatthedistributiverule R allocates to








Itis clearthat, once thelevelofcooperation
P
j2Slj isgiven, defectorsare
alwaysbettero¤ thancooperators inanycoalition. H owevertheessenceof




rule, but, atthesametime, thisreducesleisure.





libria, i.e. equilibrianoonehas anincentivetodeviatefrom. T hestrategy
wefollowtoprovetheexistenceofsuchkindofequilibriais thefollowing:
…rstweprovetheexistenceofN ashequilibria(N E), i.e. equilibriarobustto
unilateraldeviations, inthegametakingplacewithinacoalitionSofX S
agentswhentheyaretodecidetheleveloftheirtimetodedicatetoproduc-
tion, giventhattheyhavealreadycommittedtoS. T hereafterwecheckfor
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inwhichli= 1, 0 < li< 1 andli= 0 respectively8i2S.
Proposition1 Suppose the economysatis…es A ssumption 1 andthatthe
distributiveruleR isanequalsharingrule;then
1. inanysingletoncoalition, li= 1 is thedominantstrategy;
2. if® ·1, partialcooperationistheonlyN E inanypropercoalition;
3. if® > 1, generalizeddefectionisalwaysaN E inanypropercoalition;
4. ForanyX ¸2 thereexistsavalue® X < 2 , suchthatfullcooperation
is aN E inanycoalitionwithcardinalityuptoX provided® ¸® X ;if
® < ® X atleastthosecoalitionswithcardinalitygreaterthan X admit
fulldefectionastheonlyN E.
5. if® > ® I ´®¤ fullcooperationisaN E inanypropercoalition.
T he proofofthis Proposition is ratherlongand is postponed tothe
A ppendix. Substantiallyitestablishesthatinapropercoalitionofcardinality
X S thereareeitheroneortwoN Edependingonthereturnstoscaleofthe
coalitionalproductionfunction.
N owweturntoindividualrationalityofincentivecompatibleN E, since
individuallynotrationaloutcomeswillnotbeacceptedasequilibrium out-
comes. R esults aresummarized inthefollowinglistofremarks, wherewe
alwaysassumetheeconomytosatisfyA ssumption1 andthedistributiverule
R tobeoftheequalsharingtype, as inProposition1.
R emark1 If® ·1, N Earenotindividuallyrationalinanypropercoalition.
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Proof. Ifreturnstoscaleareatmostcostant, theonlyN E inanyproper



















¹l¢X ®¡1®S ¸1: (2)



















Proof. T heprooffollowsimmediatelyfromequation(2), sinceitcannever
besatis…edfor¹l= 0 andX S > 0 .
R emark3 FullcooperationN E (provideditexists) is individuallyrational.
Proof. >From Proposition1 weknowthatfullcooperationcanemergein
propercoalitions onlyifreturns toscaleareincreasing, i.e. ® > 1. Itcan
easilybecheckedthatequation(2) is always satis…edforforsuchvaluesof
® andanyX S¸1.
Summarizing, fullcooperationistheonlyindividuallyrationalN E, pro-








returns from cooperation. O ncethis conditionismet, cooperationis easier





extent: theirpayo¤ isA¢X ®¡1S . SupposefurtherthatX S is acontinuous
variable;ifanagentoutsidethecoalitionbids forenteringandcooperating
intoS, eachofthepreexistingX S agentswillreceivean increaseinpayo¤
equaltotheper-capitamarginalproductofthenewagent, i.e. (® ¡1)¢A¢
X ®¡2S . T henewcoalitionwillcontinuesustainingfullcooperationprovided,
inthenewsetting, defectionwillnotbemorerewardingthancooperation, i.e.
provided(® ¡1)¢A¢X ®¡2S ¸!. If® < 2 , theleft-handsideisadecreasing
functionofthecoalitionalcardinality, sothattherewillbeavalueofX S
constitutingan upperbound tothe cardinality ofthe coalition thatcan
sustaincooperation.
3.2 Thevalueofacoalition
IntheProposition1 sectionweshowedthat, when® > 1, insomecoalitions
therecanbetwopurestrategiesN ashequilibria: afullcooperationandafull





asituation, thereis always thepossibilityforasingleoragroup ofagents
toagreetoa(joint)deviationformingacooperatingsubgroupsuchthatthe
bestreplyofeveryoneinthecomplementarycoalitionistocooperateaswell,
thus increasingcoalitionaland individualwelfare. H ence, by allowingfor
apre-plycommunication stage, wecanconcludethattheonlymeaningful
N ashequilibrium, whenamultiplicityispossible, isthefullcooperationone
thatisbothindividuallyrationalandcoalition-proof (asde…nedin[5]).






whenreturnstoscalearegivenby® 2. T henwecanposethefollowing:
D e…nition1 Thevalue Vi(S) ofacoalitionS toan agentiis thepayo¤
thathecangetintheN Eforthatcoalition, i.e. 8i2S2 ¾ 2 §
® 2 [0 ;1]) Vi(S)·A
® 2 (1;®¤]) Vi(S) =
½
A¢X ®¡1S ifX S· ¹X ®
0 ifX S > ¹X ®
® > ®¤) Vi(S) = A¢X ®¡1S
Inwords thevaluefunction Vi(S) simplysays thatallagents recognize
andagreethatmutualcooperationwillbetheoutcomeoftheirinteraction
wheneveritis possible, wherepossiblemeansthatinplayingcooperatively
noone, neitherinagroup norin isolation, willbe incentivatedtodeviate
from thereached agreement. O utofthese situations, the impossibilityto







case1 < ® < ®¤. T hereasonforthisissimple;ifweallow® ¸®¤, therewill
benodisagreementtoagreetomutualcooperation in thegrandcoalition=. Indeed, byProposition1, weknowthat, whenreturns toscalearesub-
stantial(® > ®¤), cooperation is an equilibrium outcomeinanycoalition,= included;then, in thepre-playcommunication stage, agents willrecog-
nizetheadvantagesofcooperatingtogethersincethisbehaviourmaximizes














individualpayo¤. Inthesecond, individualmobility is constrainedbythe
vetoesthatsomeagentsinacoalitioncancastagainstthetransferof(some









onenewlyformed coalition. In ordertomakethis de…nitionrigorous, let
¼¾i bethepayo¤ thatagentireceiveswhenhebelongstoacoalitioninthe
coalitionalstructure¾;wesaythatacoalitionalstructure¾0ispreferredby
acoalitionS02 ¾0tothecoalitionalstructure¾ if¼ ¾0i > ¼¾i 8i2S0, i.e. ifa
coalitionin¾0existssuchthatallitsmembersarebettero¤ thanin¾. L etus
denotebyP(¾) =
©
¾02 §j9S02 ¾0:¼ ¾0i > ¼¾i8i2S0ªthesetofcoalitional
structuresthatarepreferredbyatleastacoalitiontothecoalitionalstruc-
ture¾. Ifperfectmobilityisallowed, thenacoalitionalstructure¾ can, and







structureandsoon. W henthisprocessadmitsnofurthermove, i.e. whena
positionisfoundsuchthatnogroupofpeoplecanimproveupontheirpayo¤,
wehavereachedanequilibrium. Thisleadstothefollowingde…nition:
D e…nition2 A coalitionalstructure ¾¤ 2 § is anequilibrium withperfect
mobility(P M CE) ifP(¾¤) = ;.
Inordertoclarifythisde…nitionexaminethefollowingexample.
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Example1 Supposewehaveapopulationofsixagents, i.e.== f1;2 ;3;4 ;5;6g.
Thetechnologicalandindividualparameters aresuchthatA = 3, ® = 1:5
and! = 2 . Simplecomputationshowsthat
Vi(S) =
8>>><>>>:
3 ifX S = 1
4:2 ifX S = 2
5:2 ifX S = 3
6 ifX S = 4
0 ifX S = 5
0 ifX S = 6
Take the coalitionalstructure ¾ = ff1;2 ;3g;f4 ;5g;f6gg;clearlyP(¾) 6=; since any coalitionalstructure ¾0 containinga coalition S0 with X S0 =
4 willbe preferred to ¾ byS0 itself. A lso the coalitionalstructure ¹¾ =ff1;2 ;3;4 g;f5g;f6gg canbedisrupted, sincethecoalitionalstructure¾00=ff1;2 ;3;4 g;f5;6gg 2 P(¹¾); indeed, in the lastcoalitionalstructure, both
agents 5 and6receive4.2 ratherthan3 andhencetheyincreasetheirown
welfare. Finallythecoalitionalstructure¾¤= ff1;2 ;3;4g;f5;6gg cannotbe
disruptedbyanycoalitionsincenoothergroupcanformatmutualadvantage
ofallitsparticipants, sothatitisaPM CE.






Beforedealingwiththemainresultofthis section, letus posethefol-
lowingnotation: ¹N ® = I mod ¹X ® and ¹Q ® = I ¡ ¹N ® ¢¹X ® . Inordertoavoid
trivialsituationsletussuppose ¹Q ® > 0 . T henwecanintroducethefollowing
de…nition:
D e…nition3 A coalitionalstructure ¾ isconcentratedwhen itis formed
byexactly ¹N ® + 1 coalitionssuchthat¹Q ® ·X S· ¹X ®;acoalitionalstructure
¾ ismaximallyconcentratedwhen itis concentratedand ¹N ® coalitions
hasthemaximalcardinality ¹X ® whilethelastonehascardinality ¹Q ®.
W ecannowstateandprovethefollowingproposition.
Proposition2 Supposethattheeconomysatis…esA ssumption1, ® 2 (1;®¤]
andthedistribution is governedbyan equalsharingrule R . Then allthe
maximallyconcentratedcoalitionalstructures arePM CE forthecoalitional
structuresformationgame.
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Proof. Firstweprovethat, inequilibrium, allcoalitionalstructuresmust
beformedbyexactly ¹N ® + 1 coalitions.
1. Ifacoalitionalstructure¾ werecomposedbylessthan ¹N ® + 1 coalitions,
thentherewouldexistatleastonecoalition, sayS, withmorethan ¹X ®
agents; in this caseallmembers ofSwouldwithdrawfrom S since,
sodoing, theygetahigherpayo¤ (atleastA rather0 ). T herefore
anycoalitionalstructure ¾0 containingacoalitionS0½S such that
X S0 · ¹X ® would bepreferredto¾ byS0, sothatP(¾) 6= ;. T his
showsthatinequilibriumtheremustbeatleast ¹N ® + 1 coalitions.
2. Ifacoalitionalstructure¾ werecomposedbymorethan ¹N ® + 1 coali-
tions, thanatleasttwoofthem, sayS1 andS2 , shouldcontainlessthan
¹X ® agents. B utthenacoalitionS0couldform suchthatS0µS1 [ S2
and ¹X ® ¸X S0> minfX S1;X S2 g;allthemembersofS0willgetapay-
o¤ Vi(S0) > maxfVi(S1);Vi(S2 )g. T hereforeanycoalitionalstructure
¾03S0wouldbepreferredto¾ , sothatP(¾)6= ;. T hisshowsthatany
coalitionalstructurewithmorethat ¹N ® + 1 coalitionscanbedisrupted
andhence, inequilibrium, therecanbeatmost ¹N ® + 1 coalitions.
>From theabovepoints, an equilibrium coalitionalstructuremustbe
concentrated. N owitis immediatetoseethatinanyP M CE therecannot
existacoalitionwithacardinalitygreaterthan ¹X ® , since, woulditexist, a
newsubcoalitioncouldform disruptingthegivencoalitionalstructureas in
point1 above. O ntheotherhand, inaP M CE notwocoalitions canhave
fewerthan ¹X ® members, since, inthiscase, thesamereasoningas inpoint
2 abovecouldbeapplied. Combiningthesefactstogether, thestatementof
thePropositionisproved.
A ccordingtotheProposition, thereisamultiplicityofequilibriaeachof
them correspondingtoonepossiblewayofcombining I agents in ¹N ® + 1
coalitions, with ¹N ® havingthemaximalcardinality ¹X ® . H oweverthestruc-
tureofallP M CE is always thesame(maximallyconcentrated), onlythe





outcome, butnowtheyareendowedalsowithavetopower, i.e. eachofthem
12
cansuccessfullycastanoppositiontotheformationofcoalitionalstructures
inwhichhegetsalowerpayo¤. Inotherwords itisas ifagents, informing
coalitions, signedcontractswiththefollowingclause: anyoneofthem will
beabletoleavethecoalitionhebelongs toonlyiftheothermembersgive
him theirconsensus notsu¤eringany loss. O fcourse, when someagents
cangetanadvantagefrom theformationofacertaincoalitionalstructure
with noothersu¤eringaloss (aParetoimprovementforthesocietyas a




toincreasesomeone’s payo¤ encounters thevetoofsomeoneelse, thenwe
havereachedanequilibrium;weshallcallsuchapositionavetoingcoalitional
equilibrium (VCE). A s in the case ofP M CE, …rstwe have tomake this
de…nitionrigorous. Supposethatsocietyisarrangedinacoalitionalstructure
¾;wesaythatacoalitionalstructure¾02 § , ¾06= ¾ , is vetoedbysomeone
ifthereexistsatleastanagentwhosu¤erareductioninhis payo¤ passing
from ¾ to ¾0, i.e. 9i2 =such that¼ ¾0i < ¼ ¾i. L etW i(¾) bethesetof
coalitionalstructuresthatarevetoedifsocietyhappenstobestructuredas
in ¾ , i.e. W (¾) =
©
¾02 §j9i2=:¼ ¾0i < ¼ ¾iª. FinallyletP(¾) havethe
samemeaningas inSection4.1, i.e. itisthesetofcoalitionalstructures in
whichacoalitioncouldformwithanetpositivebene…tforallitsmembers
withrespecttowhattheygetin¾. T henwecanposethefollowingde…nition:
D e…nition4 A coalitionalstructure¾¤2 § isaVCEifP(¾¤)nW (¾¤) = ;.
T he interpretation ofthis de…nition is simple: consider¾¤ and takea
coalitionalstructurein ¾ 2P(¾¤);thismeansthatin ¾ thereis atleasta
coalitionthatwas notin ¾¤andinwhichallmembersgetahigherpayo¤.
SinceP(¾¤)nW (¾¤) = ;, then ¾ belongs toW (¾¤) aswell, i.e. therewill
besomeagentsu¤eringfromtherearrangementleadingto¾;ifavetopower
is allowedandaccepted, the latterpeoplewillobjecttotheformation of
¾ and this coalitionalstructurewillnotform. W hen vetoes areopposed
toanycoalitionalstructurethatprovides individualandgroup incentiveto
its formation, thenwehavereached apositionwhichnoone, willinglyor









3 ifX S = 1
4:2 ifX S = 2
5:2 ifX S = 3
6 ifX S = 4
0 ifX S = 5
0 ifX S = 6
Takethecoalitionalstructure¾ = ff1;2 ;3g;f4 ;5g;f6gg andthecoalitional
structure ¾0 = ff1;2 ;3;4 g;f5;6gg. Clearly ¾02 P(¾) since the coalition
ofthe …rstfouragents improves with respectto ¾; however ¾0 =2 W (¾)
since no one is worse o¤ in ¾0with respectto ¾. Therefore ¾ can and
willbe disrupted in favourof ¾0. Considernowthe coalitionalstructure
¾00= ff1;2 ;3g;f4 ;5;6gg. Itiseasytocheckthat¾02W (¾00) sinceagents5
and6willsu¤ eralossin¾0withrespectto¾00but¾02P(¾00) sincethecoali-
tionofthe…rstfouragentgetsan improvement. Inthis casethecoalitional
structure¾00cannotbedisrupted.
W enowturntotheexistenceproblemandtothedescriptionofthechar-
acteristics ofV CE interms ofcoalitions. T hemainresultis statedinthe
followingproposition.
Proposition3 Supposethattheeconomysatis…esA ssumption1, ® 2 (1;®¤)




exactly ¹N ® + 1 coalitions.
1. Supposethereexistsanequilibrium coalitionalstructure¾ withfewer
than ¹N ® + 1 coalitions;thenatleastoneofthem, saycoalitionS, must
possess more than ¹X ® members sothatthe value oftheircoalition
is 0. N owconstructacoalitionalstructure ¾0obtainedby ¾ simply
replacingS by twoormore coalitions with cardinality less than or
equalto ¹X ® , therestofthecoalitionalstructureremainingthesame.
T henewcoalitionalstructure ¾ wouldbesuchthat¾02 P(¾) and
¾0 =2W (¾) sincethemembersofnewcoalitionsstrictlyimprovetheir
situations, whiletherestofthepopulationisuna¤ected. Fromthiswe
getP(¾)* W (¾), i.e. ¾ cannotbeaVCE.
2. N owsuppose thatthe equilibrium coalitionalstructure ¾ possesses
morethan ¹N ® + 1 coalitions;supposefurtherthannooneofthemhas
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morethan ¹X ® members, otherwisethesamereasoningas in point1
abovecouldbeapplied. T henarrangethem indecreasingorderofcar-
dinality, obtainingthesequenceS1, S2 ;:::;S¹N + 1;:::;S¹N ® + 1+ v, v > 0 ,
with X S1 > :::> X S¹N ® + 1+ v. N owtakethecoalitionalstructure¾
0ob-
tained from ¾ byredistributingtheagents in
S v
j= 1S¹N ® + 1+ joverthe
coalitionsS1;:::;S¹N ® + 1 insuchawaythatX S0· ¹X ® foranyS02 ¾0.
A nyofthenewcoalitionscontainsatleastthesamenumberofagents
asin¾ sothat¼¾0i ¸¼ ¾i 8iand¼ ¾0i > ¼ ¾i forallthemembersofatleast
acoalitionS02 ¾0. T hismeansthat¾02P(¾)and¾0 =2W (¾). A gain
wehaveP(¾)* W (¾), i.e. ¾ cannotbeaVCE.
Thus farweprovedthatany VCE mustpossess exactly ¹N ® + 1 coali-
tions. N oequilibrium coalitionalstructurecan possess acoalitionSwith
morethan ¹X ® , because suchcoalitionalstructurewould bedominatedby
theoneinwhichthemembers ofSwithdrawtoform singletoncoalitions.
N oequilibrium coalitionalstructurecan possess acoalitionwith less than
¹Q ® agents because, in this case, therewould existanothercoalition with
morethan ¹X ® agents andtheprevious reasoningcouldbeapplied. T here-
foreequilibriumcoalitionalstructuresmustbemadeupofcoalitionswitha
cardinalityincluded intheinterval
£¹Q ® ; ¹X ®¤. O ntheotherhandallcoali-





suchthat ¹Q ® · X S¤j · ¹N ® 8j2 £1; ¹N ® + 1¤andlet
¼¾¤ =
©





onlycoalitionalstructures ¾¤¤ suchthat¼ ¾¤¤¸¼ ¾¤ willnotbevetoed. B ut
giventhatVi(S) is monotonically increasingin thecardinalityofSup to
¹X ® , thecondition ¼¾
¤¤ ¸ ¼ ¾¤ canbesatis…edonly ifthere is an increase
in thenumberofcooperators in atleastanonmaximalcoalition. Since,
byconstruction, cooperation is theobservedbehaviourin anycoalition in
¾¤, theaboveresultcanbeobtainedjustbyan increaseinthenumberof
agents formingpopulation=, which contradicts theassumptionofa…xed
population. T hisendstheproofoftheProposition.
ItisworthnotingthatthesetofP M CE is includedinthesetofV CE;







>From Proposition2 weknowthatanyP M CE ischaracterizedbyamaxi-
mallyconcentratedcoalitionalstructure. Firstofallweprovethefollowing:
R emark4 In anymaximallyconcentratedcoalitionalstructure, andhence
in any PM CE, the aggregate production is greaterthan in anyother(not
maximally) concentratedcoalitionalstructure.
Proof. Takea ¹N ® + 1-dimensionalvector¸ = (¸ 1;:::;¸ ¹N ® + 1); 0 ·¸j·1,
suchthatthe…rstcoalitionin¾ hascardinality¸1¢¹X ® , thesecond¸ 2 ¢¹X ® ,
the ¹N th ¸ ¹N ¢¹X ®;forthede…nitionof ¸ wehavethatP ¹N ® + 1j= 1 ¸j¢¹X ® = I ,
whiletheaggregateproductionwillbeY¾ =
P ¹N ® + 1
j= 1 A
¡¸
j¢¹X ®¢® . Inorder
tomaximizeY¾ withrespectto¸ wehavetoputthemaximum numberof
¸iequalto1 (rememberthat@Y¾@¸i > 0 and
@2 Y¾
@¸2i
> 0 and¸i·1 8i). B ecauseP ¹N ® + 1
j= 1 ¸j¢¹X ® = I , then I mod ¹X ® = ¹N ® gives themaximum number
of¸i thatwecan setequalto1, while ¸ ¹N ® + 1 = I ¡ ¹N ® ¢¹X ® , from which
¹Q ® = ¸ ¹N ® + 1¢¹X ® . T hiscompletestheproof.
T hereforeasocialplannerwhowouldmaximizeonlythesocialoutput,
independentlyofitsdistribution, shouldoptforaninstitutionalsettingwith
perfectmobility, sinceheis surethattheequilibrium coalitionstructureis
maximallyconcentratedandhencetheaggregateoutputismaximized.
5.2 Vetoingcoalitionalequilibria




R emark5 Thetotalexpectedequilibrium outcomeinasocialsettingchar-
acterizedbyavetoingpoweris notgreaterthan thetotaloutputobtainable
inthecaseofperfectmobilityi.e.
E(Y¾)·Y¾¤ ¾¤P M CEand¾ VCE





as thatinaP M CE. ItfollowsthattheaveragetotaloutputovertheVCE
setisnotgreaterthantheoutputobtainableinaP M CE.
T henextresultconcerns thedistributionofpayo¤swithinaVCE. L et
¼¾ = f¼ ¾1;:::;¼¾I g bethedistributionofpayo¤s inacoalitionalstructure¾
andlet¼^ ¾ = min¼ ¾. N oticethatinanymaximallyconcentratedcoalitional
structure ¼^ ¾ = A¢¡¹Q ®¢®¡1; callthis value ¼^¾¤. T hen wecan state the
following4:
R emark6Theexpectedpayo¤ oftheagentintheworstposition inaVCE
isatleastasmuchastheexpectedpayo¤ ofthesameagentinaPM CE i.e.
E(¼^ ¾)¸¼^¾¤ ¾¤ P M CEand¾ VCE
Proof. FirstweshowthattheagentintheworstpositioninaVCEthatis
notmaximallyconcentrated, getsahigherpayo¤ thatanagentinthesame




ofcardinality ¹Q ® . A nothercoalitionalstructurethatgrantstotheagentin
theworstpositionthesamepayo¤ mustbeagainmaximallyconcentrated,
becausethereis nootherwayofarrangingtheremainingI ¡ ¹Q ® agents in
¹N ® coalitionspreservingindividualincentivestocooperation, i.e. remaining






couldgetinaP M CEsince, inthelattercase, allcoalitionalstructures are
maximallyconcentrated.
>From the R emarks 5 and 6wehave thatVCE have lowerexpected
aggregateoutputthanP M CEdo, butpreservetheworsto¤ agentsincehis
expectedpayo¤ isgreaterinaVCEthaninaP M CE.Fromthisitfollowsalso
thatanegalitariansocialplannermayprefer(andinduce) an institutional
settinggivingrisetoVCE (byallowingvetopower) ratherthanaperfect
mobilityistitutionalsetting. So, forexample, aR awlsiansocialplannerwould
certainlypreferaVCE toaP M CE, butevenothersocialpreferences are
compatiblewith the same choice. Suppose, forinstance, thatthe social
planner’swelfarefunctionisoftheformW (¼1;:::;¼ I ) =
P I
i= 1 f (¼i);then,
bytheShorrocks’theorem, wecanassertthattherealwaysexistsaconcave




T hefollowingexamplegraphically shows theproperties regardingthetwo
kinds ofequilibria. Supposethattheeconomy is characterized by values
oftheindividual(!) andtechnological(A and®) parameterssuchthat1 <
¹X ®
I < 2 , i.e. therewillbeatmosttwocoalitionsinanyequilibriumcoalitional


















T hehorizontalaxis showsthecardinalityofthe…rstcoalition, S1, while
theverticalaxis showsthecardinalityofthesecondcoalitionS2 . T heline
I I represents the locus ofallocations ofthe I agents in the twopossible
coalitions. Everypointinthesquare ¹X ® £ ¹X ® corresponds toacoalitional
structureinwhichthecardinalityofthelargestcoalitioniscompatiblewith
the incentives tomutualcooperation byallits members. Forinstance C
(orD ) represents apartitionofthewholesociety intotwocoalitions;the
…rstpossessesthemaximalcardinality ¹X ® , whilethesecondistheresidual
coalition. A pointasW representsacoalitionalstructurewithtwocoalitions
ofcardinality ¹X ® inwhicheveryonecooperates;howeversuchapointisnot
a¤ordablebecausethereshouldbemorethan I agents.
T hetwocurves labelledY 1 andY 2 areaggregateisoproductcurves, i.e.
anypointoneachofthem shows howmanycooperatingagents shouldbe
inthetwocoalitions inordertohavethesameamountofaggregateoutput.
Sincethecoalitionalproductionfunction F (:;:) is convex, andthesum of
18
convexfunctionsisconvexaswell, theisoproductcurvesarebowedoutfrom
theorigin. Furthermore, from themonotonicity ofF (:;:), we have that
Y1 > Y 2 .
T hetwocurveslabelledU 1 andU 2 aretheindi¤erencecurvesofasocial
plannerwithconvexpreferences (as inthecaseofaconcavesocialwelfare
functionofthetypejustseenW (¼1;:::;¼ I ) =
P I
i= 1 f (¼i), f
0> 0 , f00< 0 );







Inthis case, thedesiredresultcouldbeinducedbyan institutionalsetting
leadingonlytoP M CE, i.e. perfectmobility.
6 Conclusions
Inthis paperwehaveanalyzedtheoutcomesofacoalitionalstructurefor-





action induces amoralhazard problem, sothatpeoplecan engage in co-
operativebehaviouronlywhen itis individuallyrationalad self-enforcing.
T hepointwestress is thattheoutcomeofthecoalitionalstructureforma-
tiongamedependscruciallyontheinstitutionalsettingsrulingtheeconomy.


























T he proofofthe …rststatementis trivial;when an agentis alonehis
payo¤ isgivenby
¼i(lijfig) = A¢l®i + (1¡li)¢!; li2 [0 ;1]:
SinceA> ! byassumption1.2, thebestchoiceforasingletonis li= 1.
T heproofoftherestofthepropositiongetsaroundthepropertiesofthe




(X S¡1))thelevelofcooperationsuppliedbyallagentsinSexcepti. L etus
startwiththecase® ·1. T hepayo¤ function, conditionaltothefactthat
iisalreadyincoalitionSwithalevell¡i·X S¡1 ofexpectedcooperation
bytheothers, isgivenby



































































(X S¡1)1¡® ¢X S· ® ¢A! :
InviewofA ssumption1.2 and® ·1, wehave®¢A! < 2 andtheaboveequation
entailsX S < 2 , i.e. fullcooperationcanneverbeobservedincoalitionswith
atleasttwoagentsifreturnstoscaleareatmostconstant.















1¡® ¢X 2¡®®¡1S .


































sothatthesolutionl¤i identi…esaminimumofthepayo¤ function. B ythis,
agents’choicewillbeeithertocooperate(li= 1)whenever
(l¡i+ 1)® ¡l®¡i> !¢X SA
otherwisetheywilldefect.
Beforeproceeding, weshowthatallN E aresymmetric, i.e. eitherall
agentsdefectorcooperate(partialactionsareexcludedbythepreviousre-
sult). A contrario, supposethata N E exists inwhichthereare C < X S













Combiningthetwoinequalitiesandmultiplyingby X SA weget
C ® ¡(C ¡1)® > (C + 1)® ¡C ® ;








which is always true, in viewofA ssumption 1.2, in any propercoalition
(X S¸2 ). T hisprovespoint3)ofProposition1.
N extweshowthat, whenever® ¸2 , fullcooperationisaN E inanyS,
thegrandcoalitionincluded. Itis su¢cienttoprovethis statementforthe


















FinallyweprovethatforanySwith X S· I , thereis avalue®S such
that, for® > ®S, fullcooperation is a N E inS. In agenericcoalitionof
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